I often visit www.defensetech.org for general input on military-industrial-(don't forget the congressional) complex. There were three disparate headlines that carried an almost invisible thread between them:

• Ford Engine Powers New Boeing UAV- Boeing has developed a long-endurance (hopefully one week) high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle that utilizes an engine that is fundamentally the same as a Ford Fusion
• BRIG GEN Paul Tibbets, RIP-The pilot of the aircraft that dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan died
• Navy Sinks Another LCS- A General Dynamics (sigh) cost overrun has followed a Lockheed-Martin cost overrun, both of which led to the Navy cancelling orders for warships

What is the thread, exactly? If the military seeks to efficiently develop and procure weapons systems, the commercial sector has to do it. When I say "commercial", I mean less Northrup Grumman and more Caterpillar. The cancelling of yet another LCS just shows that the Navy is horrific at program management. The people who work for the government, generally civilians, overseeing military procurement are not, as a group, lazy. However, there is typically NO incentive for them to make decisions based on cost effectiveness. This leads to kid-in-a-candy-store behavior. "I want a bag full of extra speed. And a box of extra payload capacity. And some more quick reaction. And a bag of the stuff never rusting..." All the while, the contractor is gleefully overheating the cash register ringing it all up, envisioning a 3-for-1 stock split. VERY rarely does the piper come calling on the contractor in the form of a cancelled contract. And, if it does, they may sue the government to recoup cost. This morally slimy hand-shake leads to requirements growth that is unprecedented in the civilian world. The Boeing/Ford cooperative effort is a refreshing use of existing civilian technology to cut development costs. My own efforts to do this at work have been thwarted because too many gov't types have an incentive to not learn anything new or shave any performance margin off one requirement to gain elsewhere.

The third article, though, is the counterpoint. Col. Tibbets dropped a weapon that was developed through a crash program that spent a larger amount of money for each year of progress greater than the GDP of many nations. There was no significant need for fusion power at the scale of weaponization outside of war between nation-states, so it is unlikely atomic weapons would have been made available by commercial research. Here is a specific example of the government overseeing an almost miraculously development of a product orders of magnitude more capable than existing designs.

What to conclude? If the technology is not esoteric or far reaching, the government should just write a contract and walk away. Obviously, some development is needed. In that case, be flexible about some requirements and adjust the money flow accordingly. Obviously, some truly far-reaching technologies must be overseen and pushed by the government to come to fruition. See also: Putting men on the moon (Apollo Program)

But don't forget: The Wright Brothers were independently financed through their bicycle shop. That's right, the first men on the planet to achieve powered flight. Meditate on it.