Doints

A continuation of the previous post. A few things I observed from reading Running Critical based on the technical discussions, history, and corporate struggles presented:

• The slapdash manner in which modern weapon systems is designed has not gotten any better, but isn't much worse, either. In the 1970's Adm. Rickover's manic obsession with the nuclear reactor lead to it dominating the boat, all for a few precious knots of speed. In setting the specifications for the new fast attack submarine (now the 688 class), he ended up with a boat that was not very fast, couldn't dive very deep, was heavy because the nuclear reactor had poor power density, and was not as quiet as it could have been. But that was not a big deal, because it was expensive! His power grab in the submarine design community occurred at a time when the last vestiges of WWII combat experience were fading. That knowledge base is now gone, and we can only rely on best guesses as to what will be most critical in the next real naval battle. Submarines have evolved into such complicated monsters that nobody can realistically set specifications and know what it's going to cost to actually attain them. Throw in some feudal spats between segments of the Navy with opposing interests, and what the author accurately termed "ad hocism" reigns. I've seen this firsthand, where answers like, "we're not sure how much Option 1 or Option 2 will cost, but the one with fewer parts should be cheaper" run rampant. This may be unchanged from the beginning of industrialized weaponry (I'm thinking about those beautiful but not entirely useful battleships built in the 1930's), but it is galling to observe.
• I tell you what, those shipyards used to be nasty places. While things have been cleaned up, for the better in my estimation, maritime construction is still hardly a place for those who can't make do with the best the shipfitters can give them. I actually had a request today to install a 20" lever backwards because "it looks like it will work". That was a rare case where I told the shipyard to scrap the part. It is still interesting, though, to work in a place unique enough to have a book written that recognizably describes the buildings, smells, and behaviors of your workplace.
• One of the contributing factors to cost overruns in the late 1970's was an increase in the fundamental costs of doing business. Metals and energy both became significantly more expensive in a very short period of time. Just like 2006-2008!
• Some of the characters that have careers ruined are probably not so bad. In fact, many of the men who were ground into a fine dust while working as shipyard managers or accountants were very intelligent, and had decades of experience to inform their decisions. But that was not enough to save them from external forces (labor unions, politics, bad executive management...) that were overwhelming. This is why, to me, it seems foolish to make many decisions based on how they will affect career advancement. There are just too many men who are willing to go to just about any length to get a leg up on the next promotion, and too many external forces playing a role, to make it worth committing my life to that. As the book showed, even when you get to "the top" you may find yourself miserable. Work hard, show everybody how capable you are, and let the chips fall where they may.